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a. Executive Summary 
During the period 27-30 July 2010, the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode 
Island hosted the Irregular Challenges 2010 Game. The overarching purpose of the Irregular 
Challenges 2010 Game was to help the Navy better understand the complexity of the problems 
that it could face in these unstable regions in the maritime environment and to better address how 
it could respond.  This game could help the Navy better define the choices that it needs to make 
with regard to how it might operate in a future environment. 
Underlying conditions, such as financial, medical, population growth, and climate change, have 
the potential to stress the littoral regions and coastal environments around the globe.  They give 
rise to crime, piracy, drug and human trafficking, extremism and exacerbate weak or fragile 
states‟ ability to respond to natural disasters.  For its part the Navy has yet to address the 
confluence of these underlying conditions in a comprehensive manner.  It could be valuable to 
examine how and why the Navy should or could use its general purpose forces to help mitigate 
these conditions that are stressing the maritime environment and have the potential to impact the 
larger system that operates globally on the oceans.  While the Navy has multiple inputs to theater 
security cooperation plans in the different regions, there should be a better understanding of why 
these forces and capabilities are being used, where they are being used, and what the desired end 
state of the use of the forces should be.   
The Irregular Challenges 2010 Game was structured to explore the following four specific 
objectives: 
 
• Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy activities in 
maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges pre-crisis; 
 
• Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy activities in 
maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges during a crisis; 
  
• Identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy capabilities supporting other nations and 
organizations in maritime instability-oriented operations; 
• Provide an environment for players to explore and appreciate the complexities of 
decision-making when faced with maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges. 
 
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by the NIWO and the Naval 
War College the following overarching research question is proffered in this game:  
 What are the issues, challenges, and unintended consequences for the U.S. Navy in 
engaging in specific activities to counter maritime instability both pre-crisis and in-crisis? 
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The Irregular Challenges 2010 game was designed to enhance participants‟ understanding of the 
complexities encountered in addressing irregular challenges in the maritime environment. 
Moreover, the game served as a vehicle for the War Gaming Department of the Naval War 
College to inductively generate knowledge in order to develop hypotheses that can be tested in 
future research.  The complexities were presented as stressors and disruptors in two distinct 
resource scarcity, political instability, and natural disaster scenarios (i.e., West Africa 2017 and 
South Asia 2030).  These two scenarios were designed to provide players with the opportunity to 
deal with credible crises that may impact U.S. national security interests and disrupt the global 
economic system.  This was not a single continuous game; but rather, was designed to be serial 
in nature.  
A one-and-a-half-sided game was developed in which two independent Blue (player) cells 
employed strategies and contingencies focused on countering the actions of a notional Red 
(competitor) embedded in the White or Control cell, the latter of which was integrated into two 
future oriented scenarios. For each scenario, players engaged in two sequential moves leading to 
a consequent outcome. 
Each Blue cell was comprised of approximately fourteen to sixteen players, who represented 
various U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, Department of State, non-governmental 
organizations, and academic institutions.  One Blue cell focused on addressing irregular 
challenges from a U.S. Navy-oriented perspective (Blue #1), while the other Blue cell (Blue #2) 
explored these same issues from the point of view of a coalition (i.e., cooperative regional or 
international entity).  Both Blue cells strived to build partnerships to address complex problems. 
Each cell move consisted of two phases, a problem definition and a planning phase.  These 
facilitated sessions followed a highly inductive approach.  Data were collected during the moves 
on templates and captured by ethnographic recorders.  Written feedback in the players‟ own 
words were obtained during threaded discussions after each move.  The overall analytic framing 
of the Irregular Challenges 2010 game consisted of an inductive, phenomenological process. 
Although this approach was highly unstructured, the post-game analytic methodology follows a 
widely-used process referred to as triangulation.  Analytic methodologies included content 
analysis, grounded theory, and data visualization.  In this way, player-derived themes were 
identified at the end of the game and the analysis team explored further implications from the 







Major themes derived by the players included: 
Theme #1: Players asserted that the crises described in the scenarios were too large in 
scale, scope, and complexity to be adequately addressed given existing missions and 
capabilities.  
Theme #2:  Players asserted that confronting irregular challenges requires additional 
capabilities including HA/DR, operational-level C2, maritime intelligence and awareness, 
lift and sustainment, interagency coordination, TSC, and civil-military relationships. 
Theme #3:  Players asserted that pre-crisis activities are critical, because waiting to 
conduct activities once the crisis has commenced will require yet more capabilities. 
Theme #4:  Although pre-crisis activities are essential, players asserted that the ability to 
conduct pre-crisis activities is currently limited due to complexity, manifest through 
insufficient specialized capabilities, lack of authority, and potentially misdirected focus on 
the part of engagement entities. 
According to the players, attributes that describe an effective approach to confronting irregular 
challenges include: 
• being focused on complex and interconnected problems; 
• having the ability to address problems as a function of proper understanding of the 
complexity of the environment; 
• having cultural expertise to help understand the complexity of the environment; 
• awareness of available capabilities, both military and civilian, to better understand how to 
address the problems; 
• recognizing that problems are best addressed through pre-crisis activities; 
• working with interagency, non-government, and international partners in order to address 
problems; and 
• conducting unique missions to address problems such as building partnership capacity to 
conduct operations not normally associated with security (such as humanitarian 





Insights derived during post-game analysis are broad in nature and intend only indirectly to 
inform Navy decisions concerning train, man, and equip. 
Relationship between Humanitarian Assistance and Confronting Irregular Challenges 
Players derived that capabilities to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance were the same ones 
in many cases that were needed in confronting irregular challenges.  As numerously cited in the 
data, activities were identified by the players in order to address problems associated with a 
humanitarian assistance mission.  Data from all the cells, in both scenarios, and during both pre-
crisis and in-crisis moves reflected various activities and problems associated with humanitarian 
assistance.  Furthermore, players identified capability gaps and barriers to conducting 
humanitarian assistance, such as a lack of ability to respond to maritime disasters, insufficient 
mobile desalinization plants, scarce ability for port reconstruction, and standard protocols for 
coordinating with relief organizations.  However, the Navy‟s Vision fails to address 
humanitarian assistance as an outcome, goal, or implementing objective in confronting irregular 
challenges. 
Given the linkage identified in this game between humanitarian assistance and irregular 
challenges and the premise of the Navy‟s Vision that irregular challenges, if not addressed, have 
the potential to stress the global network and thus are directly related to national security, an 
implication may be that humanitarian assistance may be directly linked to national security.  
Furthermore, given that humanitarian assistance is a core Navy capability, the Navy ability to 
conduct and support humanitarian assistance activities has implications to confront irregular 
challenges and to maintain national security. 
Given the importance of humanitarian assistance to confronting irregular challenges, it is 
recommended that further study be conducted to explore the Navy‟s role and capabilities 
dedicated to conduct humanitarian assistance and its impact to national security. 
Cultural Expertise as an Enabling Capability 
The analysis team looked at the role of cultural understanding relative to confronting irregular 
challenges presented during game play as well as in pre-game literature review that explored 
current Navy activities such as Africa Partnership Station.  Various aspects of cultural 
understanding were evident, to include regional, ethnic, language, and religious aspects to 
cultural knowledge.  While cultural expertise does not directly address problems associated with 
irregular challenges, cultural expertise enables other capabilities that are required.   
Analysis of game data showed the importance of the desired outcome dictated by the Navy‟s 
Vision for “enhanced regional awareness of activities and dynamics to include a deeper 
understanding of ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics and norms.”  But cultural 
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expertise alone is not an ends in itself, rather it enables maritime forces to conduct activities in 
order to confront irregular challenges.   
Given the importance of cultural expertise in confronting irregular challenges, it is recommended 
that further study explore how the Navy could effectively and efficiently develop cultural 
expertise for its forces as an enabling capability to conduct activities in support of confronting 
irregular challenges and not merely as an ends itself. 
Balance between Countering Irregular Challenges and Countering Near Peer Forces 
Players seemed to have different perceptions of what constituted a crisis.  In other words, the 
threshold for intervening to a crisis was different for many players.  Moreover, analysis of game 
data reflected that players mentioned conditions of a crisis more often during move 2 (in-crisis) 
than during move 1 (pre-crisis).  Crisis could be best defined as a group of problems with effects 
that provoke a response, such as regional instability, insurgency, terrorism, or state-state conflict. 
As the crisis intensified during game play, players were less focused on conventional warfare 
concerns, such as state-state conflict, deterrence of near peer forces, and diplomacy.  During pre-
crisis/move 1 planning, activities were planned with consideration to how outside governments 
(outside governments are those of nations that rest outside the crisis region depicted in the 
scenario but had interests in the crisis region) would perceive these activities. 
Players assessed that the capabilities or level of effort required would increase as the crisis 
intensified. For a given point in the crisis, if insufficient capabilities were applied to respond to 
the crisis, then the likelihood of the crisis intensifying would increase. Capabilities to contain a 
crisis could come from the host nation, plus any additional capabilities developed by the host 
nation through building partnership capacity activities, plus assistance from the Navy, Joint, 
whole of government, and multinational entities. Some players even perceived that the 
progression of the crisis could get so bad that activities and capabilities to respond to the 
irregular challenges would be so exhausted and overwhelmed that continual focus on irregular 
challenges would be futile as conventional war was inevitable. 
The Navy‟s Vision states that the “Navy must continue efforts to balance emphasis and 
investments between countering irregular threats and countering near peer forces to successfully 
meet today‟s and tomorrow‟s threats and interrelated security challenges.”  The implications are 
that irregular challenges and conventional warfare are coupled in a different manner than 
traditionally thought.  If there is an imbalance between countering irregular threats or near peer 
forces, then there could be risk imbalance.  Furthermore, the use of general purpose forces as 
multi-mission capabilities could even increase the risk as near peer forces could perceive these 
forces as causing regional instability.  The Navy concept for confronting irregular challenges 
needs to address that a clear end state must be part of the planning process in order to meet 




The Role of Strategic Communications in Confronting Irregular Challenges 
Analysis of game data suggested that strategic communication was a recurring theme.  The 
Navy‟s Vision does not propose what role strategic communications plays in confronting 
irregular challenges during an imminent crisis.  According to game data, the primary focus for 
strategic communications seemed to be for influencing the local population of a host nation in 
order to resolve problems of instability, such as public panic, migration, epidemic, and terrorism.  
A secondary focus for strategic communications seemed to be influencing the global audience 
concerning the regional efforts in order to confront problems associated with environmental 
disaster response, building coalitions, and increasing cooperation of regional and global partners.  
To a lesser extent, strategic communication activities targeted regional actors and the U.S. 
public.  Problems associated with regional actors included increasing cooperation, countering 
propaganda, and controlling migration.  Problems associated with the U.S. public included 
environmental response and terrorism issues.   
Although further study would be prudent, the game results suggest that strategic communications 
must be incorporated in theater security cooperation plans and comprised of messages and 
activities targeted at populations in regions at risk of instability due to irregular challenges in 
order to facilitate the building of relationships at the local level. 
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b. Statement of Sponsor’s Problem 
The Naval War College has worked with the Navy Irregular Warfare Office on the concept of 
conducting a table top, seminar-style game to address the irregular challenges in the maritime 
environment.  This game would focus on the initial question: why does maritime disorder exist?  
During discussions between Professor DellaVolpe, Chairman, War Gaming Department, Naval 
War College, and RADM Greene, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, the issue of the 
underlying conditions that drive instability in the littorals was raised.  These conditions, such as 
financial, medical, population growth, and climate change, have the potential to stress the littoral 
regions and coastal environments around the globe.  They give rise to crime, piracy, drug and 
human trafficking, extremism and exacerbate weak or fragile states‟ ability to respond to natural 
disasters.   
For its part the Navy has yet to address the confluence of these underlying conditions in a 
comprehensive manner.  It could be valuable to examine how and why the Navy should or could 
use its general purpose forces to help mitigate these conditions that are stressing the maritime 
environment and have the potential to impact the larger system that operates globally on the 
oceans.  While the Navy has multiple inputs to theater security cooperation plans in the different 
regions, there should be a better understanding of why these forces and capabilities are being 
used, where they are being used, and what the desired end state of the use of the forces should 
be.   
Over the past several years, the Naval War College has worked with several fleets to help 
address the Navy‟s engagement strategy.  From analysis of these events, the fleets have increased 
their awareness of the military‟s role as part of the theater security cooperation and engagement.  
The events have also increased the staff‟s understanding of the role that these activities play in 
the strategic communications process.  However, the Navy has not looked at this problem from a 
Service perspective as to how these stressors can impact the global system and thus how they can 
make the Navy‟s mission in protecting that system much more difficult.  This game will seek to 
explore beyond just the engagement activities and their effects, as it will attempt to understand 
the Navy‟s role in addressing the conditions that can create instability and how the Navy could 
possibly mitigate them. 
The overarching purpose of the game would be to help the Navy better understand the 
complexity of the problems that it could face in these unstable regions in the maritime 
environment and to better address how it could respond.  This game could help the Navy better 




c. Objectives/Rationale for this Study 
The Irregular Challenges 2010 Game was structured to explore the following four specific 
objectives: 
• Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy activities in 
maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges pre-crisis; 
• Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy activities in 
maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges during a crisis; 
• Identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy capabilities supporting other nations and 
organizations in maritime instability-oriented operations; 
• Provide an environment for players to explore and appreciate the complexities of 
decision-making when faced with maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges.  
One of the most important functions of war gaming is to answer timely research questions posed 
by our sponsors. In order to do so, capturing data that are germane to a specific area of interest is 
critical, because successful data capture enables useful analysis and ensures a symbiotic 
relationship between game design and subsequent findings. 
"War games can help explore questions of strategy, human decision making, and 
war-fighting trends…they can often provide the kernel of new theories that can be 
tested with other tools."   
Peter Perla, Art of Wargaming  
It is important to remember that the role of any war game is to aid the sponsors, participants, and 
consumer of game results to investigate the processes of combat, not necessarily to calculate the 
outcome.  This is a highly inductive, descriptive game employing the qualitative methodology 
known as phenomenological study.  In essence, this method seeks to understand how a particular 
event impacted or shaped the views of participants by employs in-depth, focused surveying and 
broader open-ended facilitation.  The game is unique in that the players, military and civilian, 
would help define the problems that the Navy, United States Government, and international 
partners might encounter in a future, unstable region. The intent was for the scenarios presented, 
along with the game design, would provide a rich political-military environment that enabled 
each cell to explore a wide range of cultural, social, and diplomatic interactions. It is believed 
that gaming is the most appropriate method to identify, address, and analyze issues posed by 




d. Overarching Research Question 
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by the NIWO and the Naval 
War College the following overarching research question is proffered in this game:  
 What are the issues, challenges, and unintended consequences for the U.S. Navy 
in engaging in specific activities to counter maritime instability both pre-crisis 
and in-crisis?  
e. Subsidiary Questions 
What are the problems associated with irregular challenges? 
What are the underlying conditions to irregular challenges? 
How do these problems impact U.S. National Security/global security? 
What maritime activities might address these problems? 
What are the issues, challenges, and capability gaps in conducting these activities? 
f. Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables 
The independent variable in this game concerned each Blue cell„s locus of control (i.e., U.S. 
Navy-led or Regional/International cooperation (i.e., U.S.-supporting)), while the primary 
dependent variable concerned the cell„s ability to achieve its stated activities based upon its 
definition of the problem. In order to focus both Blue cells at the high operational to low 
strategic level, specific capabilities were aggregated to the greatest extent possible. 
g. Definition of Key Terms 
Irregular Challenges – threats associated with regional instability, insurgency, crime, and violent 
extremism (The U.S. Navy‟s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges, January 2010) 
Irregular Warfare – a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations (Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0, 




II. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
a. Discussion of Game Design  
The Irregular Challenges 2010 game was designed to enhance participants‟ understanding of the 
complexities encountered in addressing irregular challenges in the maritime environment. 
Moreover, the game served as a vehicle for the War Gaming Department of the Naval War 
College to inductively generate knowledge in order to develop hypotheses that can be tested in 
future research.  
As a phenomenologically based project, the emphasis of game design was to create an 
atmosphere where the perspectives and experiences of the players could be recorded for 
subsequent post-game analysis. Data were captured primarily through ethnographic (i.e., 
observed) collection by trained environmental recorders in the cells, and via self-declared player 
insights garnered through extensive, in-depth, unstructured interviews focusing on distinct issues 
and challenges. These stressors and disruptors were found in two distinct resource scarcity, 
political instability, and natural disaster scenarios (i.e., West Africa 2017 and South Asia 2030). 
At the conclusion of the game, the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) applied a variety 
of qualitative tools and techniques to aggregate data and identify key themes that may prove of 
interest to the sponsor for future research, policy making, and resourcing purposes.  
Phenomenology provides a philosophical basis for qualitative research, holding that the 
subjective experience, rather than objective observation, is the key to deep understanding.  The 
underlying assumption is that there are multiple ways of experiencing and interpreting the same 
scenario, and that the meaning of the phenomena to each person is what constitutes reality. 
Purely phenomenological studies describe and interpret the experience of people in order to 
understand the essence of the experience as perceived by those studied.  Thus, participant 
perspectives are the focus of the research.  Individuals are selected as participants based on their 
experience with the phenomena being studied, and their willingness to be interviewed and 
observed.  Typically, a series of extensive, in-depth, unstructured interviews with the participants 
provides the data for the research.  In analyzing phenomenological data, researchers must 
restrain from describing from their perspective and use the participants‟ language, terms, and 
phrases to illustrate shared meanings and consciousness. 
b. Game Mechanics 
To foster a setting favorable to phenomenological research, a one-and-a-half-sided game was 
developed in which two independent Blue (player) cells employed strategies and contingencies 
focused on countering the actions of a notional Red (competitor) embedded in the White or 
Control cell, the latter of which was integrated into two future oriented scenarios. These two 
scenarios were designed to provide players with the opportunity to deal with credible crises that 
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may impact U.S. national security interests and disrupt the global economic system.  This was 
not a single continuous game; but rather, was designed to be serial in nature. Players engaged in 
two sequential moves leading to a consequent outcome. At the conclusion of these two moves, 
game one concluded. Both cells were subsequently afforded the opportunity to independently 
reconsider their problem definition and planning strategy at the end of the first game prior 
engaging in the second game. However, game two was independent of game one (i.e., the actions 
undertaken in the first game did not carry over into game two).  
Each Blue cell was comprised of approximately fourteen to sixteen players, who represented 
various U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, Department of State, non-governmental 
organizations, and academic institutions (attendees listed in Appendix A). One Blue cell focused 
on addressing irregular challenges from a U.S. Navy-oriented perspective (Blue #1), while the 
other Blue cell (Blue #2) explored these same issues from the point of view of a coalition (i.e., 
cooperative regional or international entity). Both Blue cells strived to build partnerships to 
address complex problems.  
The overall structure for each move in each scenario consisted of two distinct phases (schedule 
of events listed in Appendix B).  The first phase consisted of problem definition, while the 
second phase was comprised of a planning process in which each Blue cell determined which 
activities were best suited to address the problems encountered in the scenario.  The problem 
definition phase consisted of a highly inductive process.  The players employed their 
considerable expertise to define the problems with which they were presented in a relatively 
unstructured, non-attribution environment. 
At the completion of the planning phase, both Blue cells #1 and #2 responded to facilitator-led 
questions designed to get to the crux of the phenomena they had encountered, and to help capture 
some of the rationale behind their decisions. These facilitated sessions were conducted by two 
Naval War College professors from the White cell, charged with fostering robust discussion 
among the players and ensuring the cells adhered to the time stamps found in the game‟s play 
book.  Each cell also consisted of DCAT members tasked as ethnographers and template control 
officers.  Subsequently, the White cell assessed what worked and did not work based on the 
templates provided by the two Blue cells.  These findings were subsequently briefed back to the 
two Blue cells prior to the second phase (i.e., planning)  in the scenario.  Thus, the two Blue cells 
were held accountable for their decisions and required to deal with their associated consequences 
in the second phase.   
Immediately thereafter in the planning phase, the two Blue Cells used their creativity to develop 
what actions need to be taken.  While the Blue cells were engaged in their problem definition and 
planning processes, the White cell with its imbedded Red element engaged in comparable 
activities; primarily from the perspective of how Blue‟s efforts could be disrupted.  Through the 
use of facilitated discussion sessions captured via the WebIQ software application, participants 
in both Blue cells had an opportunity to further define the problem, discuss their pre-crisis and 
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in-crisis problem definition and planning activities; respond to scenario updates assessed and 
presented by the White cell; and to identify ways and means to resolve conflicts or mitigate 
effects linked to unintended consequences of players‟ actions. A visual depiction of the game 
design and flow process can be found in figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Game Flow Process 
For each move, players in the two Blue cells developed the following three core products:  
 Move Templates: Separate Microsoft Word-based move sheets were generated in each 
cell for the problem definition and planning phases of the game, saved electronically in a 
folder on the Unclassified GAMENET, and routed to the White cell for post move 
assessment. Although players directly contributed to the final templates, their production 
was facilitated by a Template Control Officer (TCO) in each cell, thus allowing the 
players to stay engaged in move-based discussion rather than stepping out-of-role to 
complete the templates. The templates for blue cell, problem definition and planning, are 
included in Appendix C. Each template afforded Blue cell players the opportunity to 
perform the following:  
 Identify issues, challenges, and unintended consequences (i.e., gaps, shortfalls) 
with respect to capabilities in performing maritime security, stability operations, 
and building partnerships;  
 Prioritize areas of importance with respect to performing maritime security, 
stability operations, and building partnerships; 
 Determine the implications of those prioritized choices or the lack of choices;  
 Suggest actions that may lead to stability;  
 Make choices that help inform Navy decision-makers for the future;  





 Focused Discussion Sessions: Blue cell players actively participated in focused, cell-
based discussions with a team of facilitators from the White cell. The facilitation team for 
each cell was comprised of one CIWAG faculty member and one War Gaming 
Department faculty member. In essence, the problem definition‖ and planning templates 
served as a jumping off point for the game„s follow-on, highly inductive facilitator-
guided discussions and subsequent plenary sessions. The focus of these sessions was on 
the exploration of capabilities, benefits, and unintended consequences of engaging in 
maritime security, stability operations, and building partnerships within the context of 
each of the vignettes provided to the players (i.e., West Africa and South Asia). These 
sessions were self-recorded by players in WebIQ using a threaded discussion format, in 
which players commented on each other„s thoughts or start a new item for discussion. 
However, because it proved difficult to write and talk simultaneously, in order to ensure 
that players were provided ample time to provide written responses for post-game 
analysis, at various points in the discussion Blue cell facilitators engaged in reflective 
activities such as stream of consciousness writing exercises, where players were provide 
two to three minutes of complete silence to continuously record their thoughts or insights 
and theme capture activities, where players scrolled the list of items recorded in WebIQ 
or on the white boards and chart packs to identify key themes or emerging issues.  
 PowerPoint Flag Out brief Slide(s): Final PowerPoint out briefs were generated and 
presented by each Blue player cell on the final day of the game (30 July 2010). The two 
Blue cell final deliverables are found in Appendix D of this report. 
With respect to the White cell, because this team served as the assessment/ game play catalysts 
for Blue actions and activities throughout the game, their contributions during both phases of the 
Blue cells‟ moves, problem definition and planning, were critical for post-game analysis. The 
primary deliverables for the White Cell were the assessment templates which evaluated 
templates produced by the two Blue player cells. In addition to the assessment templates, two 
ethnographers were assigned to the White cell in order to record subject matter experts„ 
observations and insights germane to game play. To effectively capture their outputs, these 
observations were recorded via open notes in Microsoft Word. All data collected for the White 
cell were routed to the DCAT for post-game analysis. 
In addition to the deliverables for each  move, prior to the start of the game, the two Blue cells‟  
participants and White cell team members completed a background survey (Appendix E) 
comprised of questions designed to gather data about the subject„s background and experience. 
This survey, which was conducted on 27 July 2010, also afforded players the opportunity to 
familiarize themselves with the WebIQ software application prior to executing their first move 
the ensuing day. All of the questions included in the baseline survey were pre-tested (along with 
assessing overall instrument efficacy) during the Alpha and Beta tests with a ―small sample of 
individuals from the population [being studied]…or one very similar to it. Great care was placed 
to ensure survey questions did not presuppose a desired outcome on the part of the researchers 
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and did not skew the agenda. Survey questions featured a variety of Likert-style (fixed-choice), 
open-ended questions. 
c. Analytic Framing  
The overall analytic framing of the Irregular Challenges 2010 game consisted of an inductive, 
phenomenological process. Although this approach was highly unstructured, the post-game 
analytic methodology follows a widely-used process referred to as triangulation. Current 
thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic tools should be 
employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing the credibility of 
the work. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of multiple techniques is  
triangulation. This approach allows the researcher to derive the same or very similar conclusions 
using different datasets or methods. Much of the strength of triangulation stems from its ability 
to distinguish between the idiosyncratic…and the representative. Moreover, this method also 
allows the researcher to base inquiry in the assumptions being used and evaluate questions with 
the appropriate methodology, rather than the methodology driving the evaluation.  
Consistent with this approach, the seven data streams collected during this game incorporated a 
variety of research procedures into subsequent analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool 
follows. 
 Content Analysis: Described as a method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to 
describe the content of communication messages that people have previously produced, 
this approach involves identifying coherent and important examples and patterns in the 
data and subdividing data into coherent categories, patterns, and themes, as supported by 
player actions, comments, or White cell assessment.  
 Grounded Theory: A more detailed, methodologically sound approach to analysis than 
the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical 
procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data. Grounded theory 
directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make general statements 
about the phenomena they examined. For the purposes of this game‟s analysis, the Data 
collection and Analysis Team employed an inductive, theory discovery methodology that 
allowed the researchers to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic 
while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or data.  
 Data Visualization: Post game, by comparing and contrasting the players‟ activities in 
the areas of maritime security, stability operations, and building partnerships within the 
context of capabilities, benefits, and intended consequences, overlapping the Venn 
diagrams produced in the two Blue cells and developing link charts in i2 Text Chart and 
Analyst‟s Notebook, respectively, the Data collection and Analysis Team was able to 
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identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy actions supporting other nations and 
organizations. 
d. Collection Approach 
The Irregular Challenges 2010 Game was constructed in a manner that ensured  that the 
overarching research question (i.e., What are the issues, challenges, and unintended 
consequences for the U.S. Navy in engaging in specific activities to counter maritime instability 
both pre-crisis and in-crisis?) was adequately addressed. In order to do so, seven data streams 
were collected during the game. All of the Data Collection and Analysis Team members 
involved in these collection efforts received instruction in proper data capture techniques during 
a pre-game bootstrap session held on 27 July 2010. 
These seven data streams were analyzed in this game were deemed descriptive because they 
reveal the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships and systems. 
Accordingly, they were aggregated and assessed in order to clarify the information that has been 
gathered. Lastly, quality assurance/quality control of the two Blue cells and the White 
(assessment) cell datasets was conducted in order to ensure that consistency for coding and 
grounded induction was present.  
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III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
a. Summary of Game Moves 
Game play was conducted over a two-day period, one day dedicated to each scenario explored.  
The details of the scenarios presented to the players are contained in Appendix F.  For each 
scenario, the cells completed two moves.   
The following summary outlines what the players did and said during the moves during game 
play: 
Scenario 1 (West Africa) – Move 1 (Pre-crisis) 
Blue #1 (U.S.-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what activities or 
capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
Oil security – spill and 
access 
Spill response, energy infrastructure protection, maritime domain 
awareness 
Maritime security Port security training, maritime domain awareness, holistic approach 
along the Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR), law 
enforcement assistance to Naval operations 
Governance Humanitarian assistance 
Management of natural 
resources 
Humanitarian assistance, multi-national operations, fisheries 
sustainment operations and support 
Economic Civil affairs, port and maritime infrastructure projects 
Climate change Conduct more research 




Challenges of building 
coalitions 




Blue #2 (International-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what 
activities or capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
Food Humanitarian assistance, strategic lift of non-
government/international organizations/private organizations, 
port security 
Oil Spill response, counter-insurgency, hold industry responsible 
Lack of cohesive coalition Identify cooperative and capable partners, need formal mandate 
Security Maritime domain awareness, information sharing, critical 
infrastructure protection, build government capacity 
Disease Civil affairs, humanitarian assistance 
Host nation government Engagement, cultural/regional awareness, maritime domain 
awareness 
Factions Maritime domain awareness, diplomacy, lessons learned 
Negative influence from 
outside governments (China) 
Bilateral operations with China 
Environmental degradation Building partnership capacity, civil affairs 
Public perceptions Information sharing, build trust, multi-national operations 
 
White Cell players identified problems and pertinent stakeholders given the scenario.  Then upon 
review of the summary of problems and activities planned by the Blue cells, the White Cell 
players determined what would be the worst case scenario that could occur if the problems were 
not addressed.  The scenario progressed such that both Blue Cells would need to respond to the 
same crisis.  The crisis involved a massive regional epidemic (10% population died) coupled 
with a mass migration across regional borders that pose a threat of regional conflict and possible 
government collapse.  For Blue #1, a request for assistance by the host nation to the U.S.-led 
coalition served as the guidance for crisis response.  For Blue #2, a UNSCR to intervene served 
as the guidance for crisis response. 
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Scenario 1 (West Africa) – Move 2 (In-crisis) 
Blue #1 (U.S.-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what activities or 
capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
Public safety Long-term building partner capacity, humanitarian assistance, 
work with international government organizations (IGOs), 
governance stability 
Public health Medical assistance, containment 
Migration Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR), internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camps 
Security Expeditionary law enforcement, regional organizations 
Communications Maritime command and control platforms, information 
operations technology, information operations campaign 
Regional tensions Coalition building, diplomacy 
Transportation infrastructure Maritime logistics projection to shore 
Economic disruption Oil infrastructure security, international oversight of oil exports 
during crisis 
Factions Humanitarian assistance, work with non-government 
organizations (NGOs), foreign internal defense (FID) assistance 
 
Blue #2 (International-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what 
activities or capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
Epidemic containment Humanitarian assistance, DHS pandemic planning, border 
security 
Insufficient mortuary capacity Strategic communications 
Food/water shortages Humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, logistics, new 
technologies 
Global oil economy instability Find excess capacity elsewhere in the world 
Violence UN forces for law enforcement, NGOs must self-protect 





Empower local information operations, refrain from conducting 
non-combatant operations (NEO), improve communications 
infrastructure 
 
White Cell players assessed that Blue #1 was not addressing the underlying causes of the 
problems and the efforts were temporary in nature.  However, Blue #1 plan of activities to 
empower the local institutions in order to deal with the crisis were assessed as effective.  
Conversely, Blue #1 plan of activities to work with regional governments and organizations were 
assessed as ineffective.  Even though the crisis was a regional problem, a regional approach lacks 
the capability to deal with it.  The Blue #2 plan to quarantine was assessed to be ineffective.  
However, the humanitarian assistance efforts showed ingenuity and assessed as effective due the 
fairness of the process and message to the people. 
Scenario 2 (South Asia) – Move 1 (Pre-crisis) 
Blue #1 (U.S.-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what activities or 
capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
Regional conflict prevention Intelligence sharing, regional engagement, long-term economic 
development 
Intra-India conflict Humanitarian assistance only, diplomacy 
Nuclear proliferation Maritime proliferation security measures 
Terrorism Building partnership capacity (BPC) and foreign internal 
defense (FID) for counterinsurgency (COIN) 
Maritime security Maritime domain awareness (MDA), port security training, 
regional coalition 
Sea lines of communication 
(SLOC) protection 
Multinational operations 
Disease Logistics support, DHS pandemic preparations 
Global stress Strategic communications, international mandate 




Blue #2 (International-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what 
activities or capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
Scale of humanitarian crisis Sea based security, humanitarian assistance, medical assistance, 
logistics, lift, port opening, intelligence/surveillance/ 
reconnaissance (ISR) 
Maritime Instability Maritime security operations, law enforcement, diplomacy, 
maritime domain awareness (MDA), coalition building 
Regional Instability Coalition building, diplomacy, strategic communications 
Water stress Humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, diplomacy 
Public Panic Strategic communications, psychological operations (PSYOPS), 
communications infrastructure 
Migration Humanitarian assistance, legal clarification of IDPs/refugees, 
coalition operations 
Sensitive Command and 
Control (C2) Issues 
Sea based C2 platforms, establish common operating picture 
(COP), coordination with shore based NGO/IGO 
 
White Cell players assessed a major problem from the scenario involved the India-China 
competition and how U.S. relations with both nations would factor in the strategy.  Also, 
extensive debate over terrorism occurred; whether it was a cause or effect.  Furthermore, the 
degree to which a cell minimizes the maritime migration would be the degree to which it 
contains catastrophe.  The White Cell agreed with the Blue #1 assessment and plan, but felt it 
lacked addressing the potential for “loose nukes” and how to prevent Bangladesh becoming a 
failed state.  The White Cell felt Blue #2 had better assessed how water management was an 
underlying cause of the problem, but had not addressed how the interaction of nation states 
would impact their activities.  The White Cell tried to develop a move two update for both cells 
that would force them to address the issues they felt were overlooked.  Additionally, both Blue 
Cells would have to react to a major category 5 cyclone that hits Bangladesh. 
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Scenario 2 (South Asia) – Move 2 (In-crisis) 
Blue #1 (U.S.-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what activities or 
capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
China mobilizing on Indian 
border 




Imagery assessment, expeditionary command and control (C2), 
public affairs/media engagement 
Famine/drought/disease International HA/DR 
India-Pakistan tensions Diplomacy 
 
Blue #2 (International-Led) players identified the following problems and determined what 
activities or capabilities would address these problems: 
Problems Activities/Capabilities 
Humanitarian crisis Port opening, civil affairs, logistics, non-combatant operations 
(NEO) planning 
Maritime Instability Maritime refugee response, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, 
counter-smuggling, ISR/MDA, information sharing, command 
and control (C2) at sea 
Regional Instability Diplomacy, establish “World Water Regime” 
Water stress Establish “World Water Regime”, civil affairs, expeditionary 
water treatment systems 
Strategic communications Elevate the message as a world crisis 
 
White Cell players had insufficient time during the last move to assess both Blue Cell plans.  
However, they did discuss the problems and necessary activities relative to the scenario update.  
There was extensive discussion over the diversion of water.  Is the diversion of water a problem 
because it causes a number of irregular challenges or it signals an act of war between two 
regional powers?  Furthermore, there was discussion concerning what the criteria is for the U.S. 
and international community to respond with humanitarian assistance/disaster response.  Given a 
significant amount of problems facing the groups, the White Cell assessed that whatever the 
activities planned by the Blue Cells would need to have strategic communications as a critical 
element of the plan. 
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Post-Game Play Sessions 
Upon completion of game play, the players were able to reflect on their experiences and provide 
lessons learned derived from game play.  Both Blue Cells participated in a combined plenary 
session to discuss lessons learned from game play.  Then, while in separate cells again, the 
players produced outbrief summaries (Appendix D) that were presented to the flag panel on the 
final day. 
b. Analysis of Game Moves 
This section provides an overview of the main themes that the players derived as justifications 
for the activities they discussed.  The analysis team explored these player-derived themes and 
compared them to the data from game play.   
Players, through an inductive reasoning process, derived a number of hypotheses or themes 
throughout the game and coalesced on the final day of game play.  Then, the analysis team 
utilized a grounded theory approach whereby themes were identified through a process of 
constant comparison and then tested throughout the data.  Moreover, the relevance of the themes 
was determined by linking the themes to the Navy‟s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges 
in the Maritime Environment (Navy‟s Vision).  This method attempts to operationalize the 
Navy‟s Vision and inform leaders on the Navy‟s role in confronting irregular challenges. 
Theme #1: Players asserted that the crises described in the scenarios were too large in 
scale, scope, and complexity to be adequately addressed given existing missions and 
capabilities.  
The assertion that the crises were too large held true for both the U.S.-led and the U.S.-supported 
coalition cells.  The players felt neither the U.S. nor an international entity could handle the 
confluence of problems caused by irregular challenges.  As one player noted, “no one has this 
capacity, it needs to be the result of a coordinated approach.”  This player‟s observation is 
consistent with the implementing objective of the Navy‟s Vision that emphasizes 
“interoperability and effectiveness for confronting irregular challenges across U.S. government, 
public, private, and international partners.”  Although the game was designed to challenge the 
players with multiple distinct problems, the players assessed the problems to be interrelated and 
potentially overwhelming if confronted from a single line of operations.  A new way of operating 
coupled with increased capacity would be required to mitigate the effects of such an 
overwhelming crisis. 
The game data suggests that the Navy must conduct unique missions with specialized 
capabilities in order to address irregular threats.  Unique missions include activities not within 
the normal range of missions for the Navy and require specialized capabilities, such as for civil 
affairs, disaster response, infrastructure protection, force protection for NGOs, port security and 
law enforcement.  This insight supports the Navy‟s Vision which recommends providing 
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“Combatant Commanders with applicable naval capabilities to support critical mission 
requirements outside the scope of Navy core mission areas.”  Furthermore, the capabilities 
needed must support a whole of government and international approach to confronting irregular 
challenges.  The ability to work with private organizations characterizes the unique environment 
involved with dealing with the underlying causes of irregular threats.  In this way, the players 
attempted to better define the Navy role for confronting irregular challenges. 
Given the barriers that face any intervening entity, the Navy may be better suited to overcome 
the barriers to interdicting and engaging in order to confront irregular challenges before they 
escalate to crisis.  Since the Navy is forward-deployed and maintains presence on a persistent 
basis, it is in a better position to preempt a crisis or set conditions to effectively react.  Overall, 
the players supported the premise that a confluence of irregular challenges, if not mitigated, 
could create a potential for regional conflict and stress to the global system. 
Theme #2:  Players asserted that confronting irregular challenges requires additional 
capabilities including HA/DR, operational-level C2, maritime intelligence and awareness, 
lift and sustainment, interagency coordination, TSC, and civil-military relationships. 
The players were asked to identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy capabilities 
supporting other nations and organizations in maritime instability-oriented operations.  The 
analysis that follows attempts to explain why the players perceived these additional capabilities 
were needed given the scenarios presented. 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster response (HA/DR) 
Players derived as underlying conditions for many of the irregular challenges depicted in the 
scenarios to be associated with climate change, disease, water stress, and natural disasters.  This 
assessment is sobering since preventive solutions to these underlying conditions do not currently 
exist.  Thus, it can be said with confidence that the need to respond to humanitarian crises and 
natural disasters will persist in the future strategic environment.  In the maritime context, lack of 
ability to respond to maritime disasters, such as massive oil spills, proved to be capability gaps in 
mitigating the irregular challenges that emerge.  The Navy‟s Vision does not include HA/DR 
activities in order to address underlying conditions of irregular challenges, except to suggest that 
“general and special purpose forces are immediately applicable to the broad array of capabilities 
required to achieve regional security and stability.”  The players assessed that irregular 
challenges could only be addressed by dealing with the HA/DR problems identified in the 
scenarios.  Activities proposed by the players included deploying medical assistance assets, 
water production and distribution, and joint operations for disaster response. 
Players derived that if HA/DR problems are not addressed, then permanent mitigation of 
irregular challenges would not be achieved.  Humanitarian assistance was deemed to be a needed 
activity by all cells in both scenarios as well as for both the pre-crisis and in-crisis moves.  The 
problems identified during the pre-crisis moves included poor governance, insurgency, 
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management of natural resources, food/water shortages, disease, and migration.  The problems 
identified during the subsequent move as the cells reacted to a crisis included public safety, 
internal threats from factions, food/water shortages, and epidemic containment. 
Further implications of the role that humanitarian assistance has in confronting irregular 
challenges are discussed in Section IV.  
Operational-Level Command and Control (C2) 
Players concluded that the crises depicted in these scenarios were so big that they exceeded the 
maritime-based capabilities that would be available to respond.  Since the complexity and 
confluence of irregular challenges were too large and difficult to address with any set or series of 
tactical actions or missions, it would require operational level coordination of a joint, 
interagency, and multinational effort.  The Navy‟s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges 
in the Maritime Environment depicts as a goal to “enhance and formalize interoperability with 
U.S. government, public and private organizations, allied maritime and land forces, and regional 
partners.”  The players seemed to acknowledge that, in order to employ the broad capabilities of 
organizations, agencies, and partners, coordination at the operational-level needs to be available 
on a persistent basis as well as enhanced rapidly at the onset of a crisis.  For example, “rapidly 
deployable C2 nodes” were cited as general capabilities required since the communications 
infrastructure will be immature in regions of instability.  Without effective command and 
control, unity of effort would not be realized and a compilation of distributed efforts would be 
ineffective in mitigating the effects of the irregular challenges.  Operational command and 
control proves imperative to effectively and efficiently manage the resources that are sent to 
respond to the crises. 
Maritime Intelligence and Awareness 
Players derived general problems to be a lack of ability to capture, analyze, and distribute data 
associated with the scenarios.  In the maritime context, the lack of maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) and inability to share information were attributed as capability gaps.  The Navy‟s Vision 
depicts as a goal to “improve our regional awareness and understanding of complex 
environments and challenges through intelligence and information systems”.  Players suggested 
that additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and MDA capabilities were 
needed given the scenarios.  Four mission areas indicated the need to have ISR/MDA capabilities 
assist in conducting these operations: the need to conduct maritime security, the need to support 
good governance, the need to conduct humanitarian assistance, and the need to prevent regional 
conflict. For example, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) was cited as a capability that 
would have improved maritime security during energy infrastructure protection or 
counterinsurgency operations.  Likewise, situational awareness developed from ISR/MDA 
capabilities would assist the effort to conduct spill response and migration containment 
operations as part of the humanitarian assistance effort. 
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Lift and Sustainment 
Players derived that activities required to address problems associated with the scenarios 
included maritime transportation and logistics.  The speed and scale of maritime response were 
critical factors in desired response to dealing with stabilizing the regions.  The Navy‟s Vision 
highlights “Navy‟s global maritime access and sustained presence” which requires “neither a 
footprint ashore nor infringement” on a partner‟s sovereignty.  The primary activity during game 
play concerned responding to a humanitarian crisis.  The ability to rapidly respond to the crisis 
coupled with the need to conduct logistic operations from the sea proved necessary to prevent the 
humanitarian crisis from creating larger, more complex irregular challenges.  For example, 
players cited Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) capability as necessary to respond to the 
crisis due to the destruction of port infrastructure and transportation network ashore. 
Interagency Coordination 
Players suggested skill sets that exist outside of normal military organizations, such as 
linguistics, cultural, and economics expertise, are needed to support activities focused to address 
irregular challenges.  A common theme throughout the game concerned the need for increased 
interagency awareness and coordination.  The Navy‟s Vision alludes to this imperative by 
outlining the need to “leverage Navy‟s multi-mission capabilities with other services, 
interagency and coalitions”.  Furthermore, many of the activities proposed by the players were 
consistent with the mission of the U.S. Coast Guard which lacks the capacity to respond in such 
areas.  Thus, player intentions were aligned with the Navy‟s Vision which suggests integrating 
and coordinating “efforts with U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard in support of the 
imperatives and approaches in the Maritime Strategy.”  It was repeated during the game that 
many of the activities needed to address problems may not be core Navy missions.  Many of 
these activities, such as HA/DR and maritime security, are now Navy missions, but probably 
need to be better defined.  Players had wide agreement that “no single entity can handle” the 
problems associated with irregular challenges at this scale.  Reliance on working with other 
agencies such as the Coast Guard and Marine Corps was essential.   
Theater Security Cooperation 
Players asserted that dealing with irregular challenges is much easier if there is cooperation with 
the host nation and regional partners.  Additionally, any activities that the host nation could 
conduct to confront the irregular challenges themselves would relieve the burden on outside 
forces to react to a crisis.  Therefore, players planned to set conditions during the pre-crisis phase 
through conducting missions associated with theater security cooperation, such as civil affairs, 
foreign internal defense, maritime security, engagement, and building partnership capacity.  
Many of these theater security cooperation activities differ from traditional engagement activities 
in that they are focused on underlying conditions rather than on improving internal defense.  
Once a crisis occurs, port rebuilding and port security capabilities would be needed.  The Navy‟s 
Vision describes the goal of building partner capacity “by forming enduring, trust-based 
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relationships, promoting shared interests in collective security, and providing training and 
resources to enhance indigenous security force capacity.”  However, the players felt that a shift 
in focus is warranted for TSC activities.  As one player noted, “working with partner nations 
should be done with the objective in mind of future disaster and/or relief situations.  Focus on 
security is important but should not be done without awareness of working with these nations to 
assist a potential natural/humanitarian disaster.”  Another player suggested that the “Navy says 
all missions all the time, but in reality it is a war fighting focus that adapts as needed to missions 
but in an ad hoc way not in a systemic way.”  These player insights suggest that irregular 
challenge missions and the corresponding capabilities to conduct these missions should be 
elevated to a level whereby these efforts should not be executed as an afterthought with excess 
capacity of general purpose forces. 
Civilian-Military Relationships 
Players suggested that the scope of the irregular challenges depicted in the scenarios required 
activities outside the scope of Navy core mission areas.  The Navy‟s Vision calls for providing 
applicable naval capabilities to support critical mission areas and enhance interoperability with 
public and private organizations.  In a maritime context, players planned for civilian 
augmentation of military sealift capabilities and establishment of commercial maritime 
partnerships.  In a larger context, support of non-government organizations (NGOs) would be 
needed.  Since the military lacks much of the expertise, players assessed that working with 
civilian organizations would be essential to address many of the underlying conditions that cause 
irregular challenges in the maritime environment.  In determining the activities of other agencies 
and organizations, the Navy can determine its role in supporting civilian operations.  
Furthermore, players derived as an issue to be paucity within the military services of skill sets 
associated with economics, linguistics, and diplomacy. 
Theme #3:  Players asserted that pre-crisis activities are critical, because waiting to 
conduct activities once the crisis has commenced will require yet more capabilities. 
Players recognized that the problems only get worse and more complex if not addressed early.  
Activities had to be conducted before the problems elevated to a crisis stage.  In other words, it 
may be too late to effectively mitigate the effects of irregular challenges unless pre-crisis 
activities have been performed.  These pre-crisis activities extend not only beyond simply 
planning, but rather, warrant actual efforts to build capacity with host nation regional partners. 
The following statements from players, in their own words, were captured during the game and 
support the insight that activities to confront irregular challenges must occur pre-crisis: 
“This is exactly why underlying causes for instability need to be addressed and examined starting 
NOW. If we were to skip this step all we will be doing is reacting to situations, which will not 
solve the problem, merely create a temporary solution.” 
“Building those partnerships on a proactive, pre-crisis basis rather than reactively.” 
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“Coalition building must be intuitive in everything we do, not simply a crisis-generated necessity. 
Time to build relationships is always.” 
“It is important to build partner capacity pre-crisis so they are net-contributors vice net-users.” 
The underlying conditions that needed to be addressed by theater security cooperation efforts 
concerned poor host nation relationships, lack of cultural understanding, lack of political access, 
and general partner incapacity through weak governance.  Therefore, pre-crisis actions were 
limited due to factors of complexity, lack of authority, and insufficient capabilities by both the 
host nation and engaging organizations.  These limiting factors are challenges to be overcome 
during pre-crisis actions, but the players concluded that pre-crisis activities are generally easier 
to address than reacting to a crisis. 
Theme #4:  Although pre-crisis activities are essential, players asserted that the ability to 
conduct pre-crisis activities is currently limited due to complexity, manifest through 
insufficient specialized capabilities, lack of authority, and potentially misdirected focus on 
the part of engagement entities. 
Players agreed that “problems get worse and more complex and must address them before they 
get to this point.”  Furthermore, players asserted that “Irregular Challenges are the product of a 
complex set of factors and so aren't amenable to solution by short term actions.”  The game data 
showed there was a strong linkage between complexity and pre-crisis cooperation to address 
problems associated with irregular challenges.  However, many challenges were identified in 
conducting pre-crisis cooperation, such as “authority to address problems is often very limited 
pre-crisis.” 
Players asserted that complexity manifested itself because problems associated with irregular 
challenges seem to be connected with each other.    For example, “things which are challenges in 
that domain are all essentially symptoms of problems with the larger system of governance, 
including the security system.”  To overcome this complexity, forces need specialized 
capabilities to engage with partners and focus on building their capacity to confront irregular 
challenges before a crisis emerges. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the relationship across the themes derived by the players during the game. It 
suggests where the focus of confronting irregular challenges should be, based on the confluence 
of who, what, and when to conduct the activities discussed during the game.  The focus of 
irregular challenges is a function of having capabilities to conduct joint, interagency, and 

















Figure 3.1 Focus of irregular challenges 
According to game data, attributes that describe an effective approach to confronting irregular 
challenges include: 
 being focused on complex and interconnected problems; 
 having the ability to address problems as a function of proper understanding of the 
complexity of the environment; 
 having cultural expertise to help understand the complexity of the environment; 
 awareness of available capabilities, both military and civilian, to better understand how to 
address the problems; 
 recognizing that problems are best addressed through pre-crisis activities; 
 working with interagency, non-government, and international partners in order to address 
problems; and 
 conducting unique missions to address problems such as building partnership capacity to 
conduct operations not normally associated with security (such as humanitarian 
assistance and civil affairs). 
c.  Limitations of Game Design and Analysis 
One of the greatest challenges for the Naval War College, War Gaming Department is to develop 
a game that provides the robust insights into an issue or problem sought by the game‟s sponsor. 
Accordingly, managing stakeholder expectations about what final game report will tell them with 
respect to broad-based implications is essential. Stakeholders often seek findings that will 
provide them with predictive conclusions for decision-making purposes. Unfortunately, war 
gaming is a predominately descriptive process because war games are not experiments. Even if a 
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game is repeated, it lacks sufficient controls over player inputs and the central limit theorem for a 
distribution to ensure validity. In other words, sponsors should not attempt to draw inferences 
beyond what a specific group of players did in a particular game to yield generalizability (i.e., 
the ability to apply the findings observed for a small population to the broader world around us). 
Such is the case in the Irregular Challenges 2010 game. This project was designed to be a highly 
inductive, lightly structured project analyzed primarily using open-ended, qualitative techniques. 
Specific themes were discerned as a result of post-game analysis, and gaps, overlaps, seams, and 
outliers were identified using grounded induction, content analysis, and data visualization. 
However, no inferentiality or generalizability can be assumed based on the results of this game. 
The value gained from the interpretation of insights derived from game play results from the 
ability to develop new kernels of theories concerning confronting irregular challenges.  From 
these new theories, hypotheses about implementing the Navy‟s Vision can be constructed and 
tested in future research efforts, such as through gaming efforts. In this way, the inductive 
process conducting during Irregular Challenges 2010 Game will set the conditions to be tested in 
future deductive processes and games. 
Analysis effectiveness of a research effort, such as this game, can be measured in terms of the 
internal and external validity of the analysis.  Internal validity refers to the extent that cause-and-
effect relationships identified in the game can be inferred from collected data.  External validity 
refers to the extent that the results in the game accurately reflect the external conditions in the 
real-world.  A number of potential threats to internal and external validity need to be accounted 
for and the analysis effort must attempt to minimize the effect of these threats. 
Two threats to internal validity were the quality of the data collected and the accuracy of the 
analytical technique used to review the data.  To ensure quality data collection, the analysis team 
primarily relied on player WebIQ transcripts.  These transcripts were recorded threaded 
discussions of the players participating in a collaborative brainstorming effort.  The 
phenomenological research method uses the participants‟ own words to provide data for analysis.  
Insights extracted from the WebIQ transcripts were then cross-checked (triangulation method of 
using multiple data sets) with other data sets collected during the game to ensure accuracy and 
conclusiveness.  To ensure the correct analytical technique was used, multiple methods and tools 
were employed (triangulation method of using multiple techniques) to review the same data.  
These methods were content analysis, grounded theory, and data visualization.  Although 
internal validity threat mitigation strategies were used, the greatest limitation to developing 
insights and themes from the data resulted from the diverse backgrounds of participants.  Their 
different lexicon and perspectives of the same situation add a level of difficulty to interpretation. 
To explore the degree of external validity, one must ask whether the data allows generalization to 
other subjects among the population.  To answer this inquiry, one must then look at the 
demographics data of the participants.  The game was designed to inspire innovative thinking 
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given a complex problem.  To think “out-of-the-box” and define problems from holistic 
approach, players were selected to represent a cross-section of Navy, U.S. Government, and 
international perspectives.  Figure 3.2 depicts the distribution of military service, USG agency, 








Figure 3.2 Participant Background 
Table 3.3 depicts a breakdown of the participants relative to functional expertise with average 
years of experience for each functional area.  Although the average years experience for regional 
experts were relatively low, a robust number of regional expert participated, such as Navy 
attaches and foreign area officers. 




Naval Special Warfare 2 30 
USN/USMC General Purpose Forces 7 22 
Meteorology/Environmental/Oceanography 5 23 
Medical 2 24 
Logistics 2 27 
Intelligence/MDA 5 22 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster response/Civil 
Affairs 
3 23 
Regional Experts 10 11 
Non-Government Organizations 2 17 
Private Industry/Academia 5 28 
Interagency 5 20 
International Law 3 26 
33 
 
Table 3.3 Functional Area Participation and Average Years Experience 
The intent of game was to focus at the operational to strategic level of planning.  Therefore, 
participants were desired that were senior and had operational expertise in a joint and 
interagency context.  Figures 3.4 and 3.5 depict the highest education level and joint professional 










 Figure 3.4 Highest Level Education    Figure 3.5 JPME Level  
The game activities involved extensive analysis of a complex problem and participants were 
desired who had a penchant to participate in discussions and to think through highly complex 
problems collaboratively and creatively rather than according to a known procedure or theory.  








When working in a team 






When making difficult decisions, I 
prefer to rely on my previous 







When making decisions, I tend to rely 




Figure 3.6 Participant Survey Answers 
The participant characteristics suggest that the subjects reflect the intended characteristics of 
being interagency, senior, and creative thinkers. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This material may be useful to the NIWO staff as it operationalizes the Navy‟s Vision for 
Confronting Irregular Challenges in the Maritime Environment (Navy‟s Vision) and drafts the 
supporting Navy Concept. The insights discussed here result from an inductive reasoning 
approach and do not test a conclusive set of hypothetical actions that could be executed in a 
different context – for instance, in the real world or even in other scenarios. However, the 
problems, underlying conditions, linkages, and activities developed by experts with a significant 
understanding of the region and functional areas were broad in nature and intend only indirectly 
to inform Navy decisions concerning train, man, and equip. 
Relationship between Humanitarian Assistance and Confronting Irregular Challenges 
Players derived that capabilities to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance were the same ones 
in many cases that were needed in confronting irregular challenges.  As numerously cited in the 
data, activities were identified by the players in order to address problems associated with a 
humanitarian assistance mission.  Data from all the cells, in both scenarios, and during both pre-
crisis and in-crisis moves reflected various activities and problems associated with humanitarian 
assistance.  Furthermore, players identified capability gaps and barriers to conducting 
humanitarian assistance, such as a lack of ability to respond to maritime disasters, insufficient 
mobile desalinization plants, scarce ability for port reconstruction, and standard protocols for 
coordinating with relief organizations.  However, the Navy‟s Vision fails to address 
humanitarian assistance as an outcome, goal, or implementing objective in confronting irregular 
challenges.  This situation makes one ponder what the linkage is between humanitarian 
assistance and national security. 
In reference to A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower, it is proposed that Theater 
Security Cooperation should focus on capacity-building, maritime governance, law enforcement, 
and humanitarian assistance.  But it lists the reason why humanitarian assistance/disaster 
response is stated as an objective is because human suffering “moves us to act”.  There seems to 
be no direct connection of humanitarian assistance to national security.  However, it goes on to 
suggest that interdicting in regional crises should be done before they impact beyond their area.  
This concern seemed consistent with the concern the players had in the game whereby irregular 
challenges that remained unmitigated could evolve to regional crises that could stress the global 
system. 
In reference to the Naval Operational Concept (NOC), the humanitarian assistance mission is  
referenced as a core mission for the Navy as well as part of confronting irregular challenges.  It 
states that the purpose of employing humanitarian assistance and disaster response is to promote 
safety, security, and stability.  However, it also states that many humanitarian assistance 
activities “may not be directly related to national security”, but rather it relates to American 
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values.  Since the Navy‟s Vision defines irregular challenges as threats related to regional 
instability, then conducting humanitarian assistance to promote regional stability would address 
the underlying causes of the threats associated with irregular challenges.  Data from the game 
suggest that humanitarian assistance problems are underlying causes to irregular challenges.  If 
one fails to address the underlying causes then one fails to permanently solve the irregular 
challenge problem, but merely creates a temporary solution. 
The Navy‟s Vision addresses building partnership capacity as increasing indigenous security 
forces capacity.  However, players felt that a focus on improving security capacity misses the 
mark if capacity for indigenous forces does not improve capacity to conduct humanitarian 
assistance.  This concept suggests that a host nation‟s ability to deal with humanitarian assistance 
problems will improve stability by mitigating the underlying causes of irregular threats. 
Given the linkage identified in this game between humanitarian assistance and irregular 
challenges and the premise of the Navy‟s Vision that irregular challenges, if not addressed, have 
the potential to stress the global network and thus are directly related to national security, an 
implication may be that humanitarian assistance may be directly linked to national security.  
Furthermore, given that humanitarian assistance is a core Navy capability, the Navy ability to 
conduct and support humanitarian assistance activities has implications to confront irregular 
challenges and to maintain national security. 
Given the importance of humanitarian assistance to confronting irregular challenges, it is 
recommended that further study be conducted to explore the Navy‟s role and capabilities 
dedicated to conduct humanitarian assistance and its impact to national security. 
Cultural Expertise as an Enabling Capability 
The analysis team looked at the role of cultural understanding relative to confronting irregular 
challenges presented during game play as well as in pre-game literature review that explored 
current Navy activities such as Africa Partnership Station.  Various aspects of cultural 
understanding were evident, to include regional, ethnic, language, and religious aspects to 
cultural knowledge.  While cultural expertise does not directly address problems associated with 
irregular challenges, cultural expertise enables other capabilities that are required.  Table 3.1 
depicts how knowledge of certain aspects of cultural understanding improves the ability to 







Knowledge Area Activities Enabled 
Cultural/regional ISR, planning, HA/DR, civil affairs, governance, as proxy for physical 
presence, strategic communications, TSC/BPC 
Ethnic tensions Understanding of underlying conditions (perceived by the players as a 
cause of instability and poor governance) 
Language Interoperability with host nation forces, information operations, strategic 
communications, improve local public perceptions, ISR, build regional 
coalitions, command and control 
Religious Building coalitions, HA/DR, counterterrorism, information operations, 
working with religious leaders/groups in order to reduce regional 
tensions and improve cooperation 
Table 3.1 Activities enabled through knowledge of cultural aspects of environment 
Analysis of game data showed the importance of the desired outcome dictated by the Navy‟s 
Vision for “enhanced regional awareness of activities and dynamics to include a deeper 
understanding of ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics and norms.”  But cultural 
expertise alone is not an ends in itself, rather it enables maritime forces to conduct activities in 
order to confront irregular challenges.  The two broad areas that cultural expertise proved helpful 
involved overcoming complexity and conducting pre-crisis activities.  By understanding the 
underlying conditions of the complex problems associated with irregular challenges, cultural 
expertise allows planners to develop a correct course of action to address these problems (“doing 
the right things”).  Moreover, cultural expertise improves the effectiveness of pre-crisis 
operations, such as those associated with TSC plans, conducted to address the causes of an 
emerging crisis (“doing things right”).  As one player conveyed, “Local presence (embassies and 
U.S. citizens with local experience) are critical info sources before and during crisis. Must tap 
them.” 
Given the importance of cultural expertise in confronting irregular challenges, it is recommended 
that further study explore how the Navy could effectively and efficiently develop cultural 
expertise for its forces as an enabling capability to conduct activities in support of confronting 
irregular challenges and not merely as an ends itself. 
Balance between Countering Irregular Challenges and Countering Near Peer Forces 
Players seemed to have different perceptions of what constituted a crisis.  In other words, the 
threshold for intervening to a crisis was different for many players.  Moreover, analysis of game 
data reflected that players mentioned conditions of a crisis more often during move 2 (in-crisis) 
than during move 1 (pre-crisis).  Crisis could be best defined as a group of problems with effects 
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that provoke a response, such as regional instability, insurgency, terrorism, or state-state conflict.  
Some players felt move 1 scenario was not a crisis and others felt move 1 was a significant crisis.  
The data in table 3.2 suggest that the players generally associated move 2 to be crisis more than 
move 1. 
Given this increase in intensity of crisis conditions, the mission focus of the players was 
examined.  As the crisis intensified, players were less focused on conventional warfare concerns, 
such as state-state conflict, deterrence of near peer forces, and diplomacy.  During pre-
crisis/move 1 planning, activities were planned with consideration to how outside governments 
(outside governments are those of nations that rest outside the crisis region depicted in the 
scenario but had interests in the crisis region) would perceive these activities.  The data in table 
3.2 suggest that the players were more concerned during move 1 (pre-crisis) about the 
perceptions that outside governments would have of activities planned than during move 2 (in-
crisis response). 
 Move 1 Move 2 
Number of Data Documents 17 14 
Crisis 32 44 
Outside governments 175 79 
Table 3.2 Number of references in data documents 
The risk of escalation to conventional warfare seemed to be an important planning factor by the 
players.  As depicted in figure 3.7, the scenario presented a confluence of irregular challenges 
that intensified the crisis conditions.  Players assessed that the capabilities or level of effort 
required would increase as the crisis intensified. For a given point in the crisis, if insufficient 
capabilities were applied to respond to the crisis, then the likelihood of the crisis intensifying 
would increase. Capabilities to contain a crisis could come from the host nation, plus any 
additional capabilities developed by the host nation through building partnership capacity 
activities, plus assistance from the Navy, Joint, whole of government, and multinational entities. 
Some players even perceived that the progression of the crisis could get so bad that activities and 
capabilities to respond to the irregular challenges would be so exhausted and overwhelmed that 





Figure 3.7 Risk Relationship of Capabilities Required to Crisis Intensity 
The Navy‟s Vision states that the “Navy must continue efforts to balance emphasis and 
investments between countering irregular threats and countering near peer forces to successfully 
meet today‟s and tomorrow‟s threats and interrelated security challenges.”  The implications are 
that irregular challenges and conventional warfare are coupled in a different manner than 
traditionally thought.  If there is an imbalance between countering irregular threats or near peer 
forces, then there could be risk imbalance.  Furthermore, the use of general purpose forces as 
multi-mission capabilities could even increase the risk as near peer forces could perceive these 
forces as causing regional instability.  The Navy concept for confronting irregular challenges 
needs to address that a clear end state must be part of the planning process in order to meet 
irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of multi-mission capabilities. 
The Role of Strategic Communications in Confronting Irregular Challenges 
Analysis of game data suggested that strategic communication was a recurring theme.  The 
Navy‟s Vision does not propose what role strategic communications plays in confronting 
irregular challenges during an imminent crisis.  Thus, the analysis team looked into what context 
strategic communications were used throughout the game and at what audiences were targeted 
by the planned messages and activities. 
According to the Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept (Version 1.0, 7 October 
2009), the military problem for implementing strategic communications involves “how could a 
future joint force commander plan and execute joint operations to affect the behaviors of selected 
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populations, governments or other decision‐making groups to accomplish the mission and 
promote broader national interests in a socially complex and globally interconnected information 
environment?” 
According to game data, the primary focus for strategic communications seemed to be for 
influencing the local population of a host nation in order to resolve problems of instability, such 
as public panic, migration, epidemic, and terrorism.  One player proposed the “use local figures 
of authority as the communicators (those who deliver the message to the target audience). 
Influencing them is the first step, but ultimately the message to the wider audience must come 
from those figures of authority.” 
A secondary focus for strategic communications seemed to be influencing the global audience 
concerning the regional efforts in order to confront problems associated with environmental 
disaster response, building coalitions, and increasing cooperation of regional and global partners.  
A player noted that “in other potential (less catastrophic) challenges, the incentives and 
objectives may differ more strikingly for the U.S. and possible coalition partners and other 
actors; this will take more sophisticated coalition building tools and strategic communication 
tools.” 
To a lesser extent, strategic communication activities targeted regional actors and the U.S. 
public.  Problems associated with regional actors included increasing cooperation, countering 
propaganda, and controlling migration.  A player suggested that “Strategic comms and a targeted 
influence campaign are a necessary part of any effort to counter radicalism.”  Problems 
associated with the U.S. public included environmental response and terrorism issues.  As a 
player recommended, “positive strategic communications in the area of environmental 
protection, adaptation and mitigation efforts to deal with climate change (all facilitated/promoted 
by the U.S.-led coalition) can assist the overall effort to gain popular support for U.S. 
involvement in the region.” 
The Global ‟08 Game held at the Naval War College explored the requirements for 
implementing CS21.  The findings from Global ‟08 suggested that strategic communications 
should be an integral part of any U.S. maritime strategy.  The Global ‟08 Game also highlighted 
the importance of strategic communications as part of a comprehensive “whole of government” 
approach and in building relationships as part of a humanitarian assistance initiative.  The 
Irregular Challenges Game likewise suggested that strategic communications must be embedded 
in a “whole of government” plan to confront irregular challenges.  As a player proposed, 
“Strategic Communications play a vital role and must be used to influence audiences and help us 
create outcomes.”   
Although further study would be prudent, the game results suggest development of capabilities, 
as dictated in the Strategic Communications JIC, “to conceive and coordinate physical actions or 
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maintain physical capabilities designed to influence selected audiences as desired.”  Strategic 
communications must be incorporated in theater security cooperation plans and comprised of 
messages and activities targeted at populations in regions at risk of instability due to irregular 
challenges in order to facilitate the building of relationships at the local level. 
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V. APPENDICES AND SUPPLEMENTAL DATA 
a. Appendix A - Attendees 
Blue Cell #1 
Billet 
#          Billet Player Billet Description  
1 Flag Lead A RDML Mike Yurina USN (O7) with JTF or TSC experience 
2 TSC Planner A Robert Collins USN (O4-6) NCC TSC 
3 NECC A Al Nugent USN (O4-6) with understanding of NECC missions 
4 NSW/SOF A CDR Gary Richard USN (O4-6) NSW community 
5 FAO/Attaché A 
CDR Michael 
Baker  
USN (O4-6) with FAO or attaché experience 
(AFRICOM or South Asia) 
6 USCG A 
LCDR Daniel 
Schaeffer 
USCG (O4-6) with Building Partnership Capacity 
experience 
7 USMC A 
MAJ Prescott 
Boisvert USMC (O4-6) with FID or seabasing experience 
8 ISR/MDA A LCDR Mark Wright 
USN (O4-6) MDA experience preferred with ISR 
secondary 
9 ISR CDR Pat Olsen N00X Integration IW 
10 LOG A CDR Marc Bianco USN with operational logistics/contracting experience 
11 Med Planner A 
CDR Kari 
Buchanan 
USN medical planner with understanding of disease 
vector 
12 Climatology A 
CDR Blake 
McBride USN (O4-6) expert in climate change 
13 Economics SME A Julie Gerschick CIV expert in resource mining/manufacturing/finance 






CIV expert in paleoclimatology/water 
stress/agriculture/fisheries 






CIV expert (DOS/USAID) with knowledge of gov 
agencies and NGOs 
18 
West Africa SME 
A * Andrea Walther CIV expert in West and Central Africa region 
19 Facilitator Shawn Burns NWC faculty 
20 Facilitator Marc Genest CIWAG faculty 
21 ER Bob Holtz NWC environmental recorder for White Cell 
22 ER Matt McGillis NWC environmental recorder for White Cell 






Blue Cell #2 
Billet 
#          Billet Player Billet Description  
24 Cell Lead B CAPT Richard Brown 
USN (O7) with experience working w/ Intl 
partners 
25 TSC Planner B LtCol Richard Musser USN (O5) NCC TSC from Pacific Fleet N5 
26 NECC CA LTjg Dan Day USN (O5) NECC Civial Affairs/FID 
27 FAO/Attaché B Mr. Chris Clary 
USN (O4-6) with FAO or attaché experience 
(AFRICOM or South Asia) 
28 FAO/Attache CDR Gary Parker 
USN (O4-6) with FAO or attaché experience 
(AFRICOM or South Asia) 
29 ISR/MDA B Guy Thomas 
USN (O4-6) MDA experience preferred with ISR 
secondary 
30 LOG B CDR Tom Trefny 
USN with operational logistics/contracting 
experience 
31 Med Planner B CAPT Mark Lyles 
USN medical planner with understanding of 
disease vector 
32 Climatology B Dr. Kathryn Moran USN (O4-6) expert in climate change 
33 Ecology SME B Jean-Pierre Ple CIV expert in agriculture/fisheries 
34 Economics SME B Joe Nicholas 
CIV expert in resource 
mining/manufacturing/global finance 
35 NGO SME A 
Ms. Marjolaine 
Greentree  
CIV expert in governance, food distribution, or 
relief orgs 
36 HA/DR Jim Welsh CIV expert from COE for Disaster response & HA 
37 
Environmental SME 
B Dr. Scott Doney CIV expert in paleoclimatology/water stress 
38 Maritime Security Dr. Martin Murphy CIV expert in global maritime security 
39 I/O SME B Vernan Watts CIV expert with expertise on  Intl orgs/UN/AU 
40 Nigeria SME B * Dr. Jimmie Newton CIV expert in Nigeria 
41 
Bangladesh SME B 
** 
Amb Mary Ann 
Peters CIV expert in South Asia region 
42 Facilitator Dave DellaVolpe NWC faculty 
43 Facilitator Andrea Dew CIWAG faculty 
44 ER Karl Von Buren NWC environmental recorder for White Cell 
45 ER Jim Fisher NWC environmental recorder for White Cell 






#          Billet Player Billet Description  
47 JAG LCDR Colin Topp  USN with UNCLOS knowledge 
48 JAG-B Mr. Pete Pedrozo USN with UNCLOS knowledge 
49 Navy 
LCDR Jennifer 
Lyons USN (O4-6) surface warfare officer 
50 NGO Mr. John McKenney  CIV expert in governance, food distro, or relief orgs 
51 China SME Nan Li 
CIV SME with knowledge of China’s interests in 
Africa and S Asia 
52 China SME-C Peter Dutton 
CIV SME with knowledge of China’s interests in 
Africa and S Asia 
53 Media Dr Joachim Maitre  CIV SME for international media issues 
54 Economics SME 
Dr. Leif 
Rosenberger  CIV SME in global economics 
55 Interagency SME Ms. Anita Kraska  
CIV expert with knowledge of gov agencies and 
international organizations 
56 West Africa SME John Fobanjong CIV SME in West Africa region 
57 
South Asia SME A 
** Dr Aparna Pande CIV expert in South Asia region 
58 ISR/MDA A Keith Barber 
USN (O4-6) MDA experience preferred with ISR 
secondary 
59 Law Enforcement Jay Carrigan NCIS 
60 Intel SME Pete Thompson 
SME for piracy/trafficking/bunkering/poaching/ 
corruption/terrorism 
61 Intel SME Mr. Greg Davis 






Inglese Medical, disease control, and disaster management 
63 Game Sponsor John Sandoz Senior representative of co-sponsor (NIWO) 
64 Observer Dr. Bill Casey ELG-Executive Leadership Group 
65 Observer Ms. Wendi Peck  ELG-Executive Leadership Group 
66 Observer Rob Holser NIWO 
67 Observer 
Dr. William 
Rosenau NIWO/CNA  
68 Game Director Doug Ducharme NWC Overall control of Game 
69 Assessor Devron Eakins NWC Provides adjudication/assessment 
70 Assessor Matt Gonsalves NWC Provides adjudication/assessment 
71 Assessor Jeffrey Israel NWC Provides adjudication/assessment 
72 ER Joe Maslowski NWC environmental recorder for White Cell 
73 ER Virginia Cruse NWC environmental recorder for White Cell 
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74 TCO Lief Bergey NWC Template Control Officer 
75 Game Controller Dr. Mike Vlahos NWC Provides adjudication/assessment 
76 Facilitator Mike Martin NWC faculty 
77 Facilitator CAPT Tom Sass CIWAG faculty 
78 
Logistics 




b. Appendix B - Schedule of Events 
Tuesday, July 27, 2010   
Start End Event Remarks Location  
0800 1130 Travel Travel or free time Various 
1130 1300 Check-In Registration  MLH Lobby 
1300 1315 Welcome 
PNWC Welcome, Admin 
Remarks DSC 





1400 1430 Brief 
Navy’s Vision for Confronting 
Irregular Challenges 
DSC 
1430 1445 Brief Game Rules, Vignette 1 DSC 
1445 1500 Break Break 
MLH Mess 
Area 
1500 1630 Prep 
Cell Familiarization, WebIQ 
Training 
Cells 
1700 1900 Social IC Icebreaker (No Host) Officers Club 
 
Wednesday, July 28, 2010   
Start End Event Remarks Location  
0800 0930 V1-M1 Vignette 1- Move 1 Planning Game Cells 
0930 0945 Break Break 
MLH Mess 
Area 
0945 1115 V1-M1 Vignette 1- Move 1 Execution Game Cells 
1115 1200 V1-M1 Post Move 1 Discussion Game Cells 
1200 1300 Lunch Player Lunch/Assessment  NWC Cafe  
1300 1430 V1-M2 Vignette 1- Move 2 Planning Game Cells 
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1430 1445 Break Break 
MLH Mess 
Area 
1445 1615 V1-M2 Vignette 1-Move 2 Execution Game Cells 
1615 1700 V1-M2 Post Move 2 Discussion Game Cells  
 
Thursday, July 29, 2010   
Start End Event Remarks Location  
0745 0800 V2 Vignette 2 Introduction Game Cells 
0800 0930 V2-M1 Vignette 2- Move 1 Planning Game Cells 
0930 0945 Break Break 
MLH Mess 
Area 
0945 1115 V2-M1 Vignette 2- Move 1 Execution Game Cells 
1115 1200 V2-M1 Post Move 1 Discussion Game Cells 
1200 1300 Lunch Player Lunch/Assessment  NWC Cafe  
1300 1430 V2-M2 Vignette 2- Move 2 Planning Game Cells 
1430 1445 Break Break 
MLH Mess 
Area 
1445 1630 V2-M2 Vignette 2-Move 2 Execution Game Cells 
1630 1730 V2-M2 Combined Plenary DSC  
 
Friday, July 30, 2010   
Start End Event Remarks Location  
0800 0945 Prep 
Prep Time for Final Cell 
Debriefs  Game Cells 
0945 1000 Break Break MLH Mess Area 
1000 1130 Brief Cell Final Briefs DSC 
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1130 1200 Brief Final Comments DSC 
1200 
 




c.   Appendix C - Facilitator Questions/Templates 
Collection Template – Move X Problem Definition 
Conduct a brainstorming session to identify problems associated with the 
impending crisis: 
 Focus on the Phase 0 (Pre-Crisis) Shaping Operational Environment  
 Lens should be from the Blue perspective, Cell 1 = U.S.-Led, Cell 2 = U.S.-
Supported 
 Not necessary to differentiate among problems or underlying conditions or 
causes 
 Inductive approach of starting with broad concepts and narrowing down to 
specific concepts 
 Problems associated with maritime environment should be particularly 
explored 
 Try to identify connections among the problems 
 Prioritize the problems 
 Associate the problems with various nodes 
   
What are the overall problems? 
Why is it a problem? 
What is the cause of this problem? 
What is the impact of this problem? How is it critical to U.S. National Security, Global 
Security, Regional Security? 
How is this problem linked to other problems? 
Is this problem the concern of the maritime sector? 
What is the most important problem? 
This problem is most associated with which node depicted on the template? 
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Problem What caused 
it 
Who does it 
affect 
Why Priority 
     
     
 
Collection Template – Move X Planning 
Construct a prioritized list of maritime capabilities-based activities to address 
the problems: 
 What activities are needed to address the problems?  Good approach is to start with the 
most important problem. 
 Capabilities are essentially the ability to conduct activities 
 Are the activities maritime-focused? 
 Prioritize activities – what are most relevant activities based on the problems defined? 
what if you can only do one?  Which is highest priority?  
 What is the best strategy to conduct these activities?  Phased? Synchronized? Focus 





Why Activity Category 
M,W,I 
Priority 
       
















e.   Appendix E - Survey Questions 





RANK (MILITARY/RETIRED) OR CIVILIAN TITLE_________________________________ 
 
MILITARY SERVICE OR AGENCY:_______________________________________________ 
 
DESIGNATOR, MOS, OR SPECIALTY:_______________________________ 
 
TOTAL YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE OR EXPERIENCE IN SUBJECT AREA:_______________ 
 
AGE:_________   GENDER:   M____     F____ 
 
 
HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL COMPLETED (CHECK ONE): 
 
_____ High School                 ______Associate‟s Degree      _______Graduate Degree   
 
_____Technical Certificate     ______Bachelor‟s Degree       _______Juris Doctorate 
 
_____Doctoral Degree (PhD, PsyD, Ed.D)        _______Medical Degree    ____Other 
 
 
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY): 
 
 ___MSOC _____JPME I    _____JPME II  _____JOINT TOUR   ____OTHER  ____NONE 
 
 





FOR EACH OF THE QUESTIONS LISTED BELOW, PLEASE SELECT THE VALUE THAT 














According to the Chief of Naval 
Operations Vision for Confronting 
Irregular Challenges (January 2010), 
irregular challenges are defined as 
…regional instability, insurgency, crime, 
and violent extremism (p. 2).   
1. Based on this definition, I believe 
that I have a sufficient experience and 
understanding of irregular challenges 
to assist the White Cell with assessing 
the activities and priorities of the Blue 













2. When working in a team 














3. When making difficult decisions, I 
prefer to rely on my previous 













4. When making decisions, I tend to 





f.   Appendix F - Scenario Details 
 West Africa 2017 
The following background information concerning West Africa was provided: 
• For more than 60 years, West Africa  has experienced periods of marked improvement in 
technology and public health infrastructure. However it has also been subjected to 
protracted natural resource exploitation, ethnic strife, and public corruption.  
• Between 2010 and 2016, a series of events/trends develop in both the Gulf of Guinea 
region, with many of these issues centering on Nigeria.   
• Among the major issues affecting the region are:  
• Increasing violence in the Niger Delta 
• Much of the violence is the result of indigenous groups clashing with the 
government over oil company policies and the equitable distribution of net 
proceeds    
•  Increasing piracy and maritime criminal enterprises  
• Growing Chinese involvement and influence in the region  
• Kidnappings of foreign citizens in Niger Delta increases more than 100% between 2010 
and 2012 (350 in last 18 months) 
• US and European Oil Executives increasingly targeted 
• Vessel hijackings becoming increasingly common 
• Ransom sought in most cases, but political demands increase and some victims 
held indefinitely 
• Port Harcourt frequently under siege from outbreaks of violence 
• Involves rival ethnic, criminal, and opposition groups, along with Nigerian 
military/police trying to restore order 
• Thousands of civilians displaced 
• NGO ops difficult and dangerous with ongoing violence 
• Niger Delta separatists loosely confederated as the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND)   
• Approximately 20,000 hard core guerrillas  
• Some estimates place this number as high as 70,000 (including sympathizers)  
• Numbers difficult to confirm; attacks conducted by unaffiliated militants but 
attributed to MEND 
• Skilled at operating in squad and platoon-sized elements  
• Raids, ambushes, sabotage operations 
• By 2016, MEND becomes highly capable conducting riverine operations, 
including vessel boarding and hijacking, and in multi-axis, combined-arms, small 
boat swarm attacks using 20+ vessels  
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• Up through 2016, Niger Delta separatists operated primarily in Bayelsa, Delta, and 
Rivers states 
• Active in other coastal states  
• Executed attacks as far inland as Abuja 
• Successfully attacked offshore oil facilities over 60nm from coast  
• Largely Tuareg Rebel Organization 
• Includes other nomadic ethnicities, i.e. Toubou, Fulani 
• Claims 3500 fighters, many Nigerien Forces defectors 
• Goals 
• Wants greater share of northern Niger's uranium wealth 
• World‟s third largest uranium deposit in northern Niger 
• Actively targets Chinese and French companies 
• Illicit Activity 
• West Africa a key route for the trafficking of South American cocaine to Europe 
• Overland route across the Sahara facilitated by Tuaregs  
• MNJ Success 
• Jun 2010: Agadez airport attack; 70+ soldiers captured  
• Jul 2011: Kidnap Chinese nuclear engineer 
• Jun 2012: Kidnap French state nuclear corps workers 
• Feb 2013: Coup leaders announce audit of all uranium, gold contracts awarded 
under previous government  
• Militant and military activity increasing in waters off Nigeria and Cameroon 
• Piracy Incidents  
• Illegal ship boarding to steal cargo and valuables 
• Gunmen boarding vessels at sea  
• Holding vessels, crew, passengers for ransom 
• Increasing trend towards kidnapping and political intimidation 
• Drug Trafficking 
• West Africa is a major critical node in drug smuggling routes bound for North 
America and Europe 
• Several drug rings operating in Nigeria and the surrounding countries 
• Drug-smuggling networks operate globally 
• Heroin from India and Pakistan transferred westward through Africa to Europe 
and North America 
• Cocaine from South America for distribution in Europe and Asia 
• Profits fuel militant gang activity in the Niger Delta (including MNJ) 
• Weapons smuggled from Central and South America increasingly bound for West Africa 
ports 
• Weapons find customers in Africa, including Niger Delta militants 
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• Large amounts of weapons are smuggled into Nigeria via bulk cargo vessels 
• Warri - hub for illegal gun sales in Nigeria 
• Many illegal weapons smuggled from Liberia and Sierra-Leone 
• Many smugglers operate out of Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Nigeria  
• Using fast boats, smugglers rendezvous with ships in open ocean and transfer 
cargo 
• In November 2013, customs officials intercepted a ship carrying 170,000 rounds 
of ammunition concealed in a cargo of charcoal that had crossed the border from 
Benin into Nigeria 
• Illegal fishing by foreign trawlers drastically reduces fishing stocks in the Gulf of Guinea  
• Many illegal fishing vessels alleged to originate in Spain and other European 
nations 
• Local fishing catch diminishes drastically due to illegal fishing  
• Estimated 50,000 -140,000 tons fish illegally caught in the W/C Africa nations‟ EEZs 
each year 
• Preferred methods of illegal fishing (e.g. drift nets) also environmentally damaging 
 
The following “road to crisis” elements were presented to the players: 
• In 2013, a massive drought causes food insecurity throughout West Africa.    
• Human migration into the Southern Nigerian cities and towns from Northern 
regions.  
• Over half of Niger‟s population and 20% of Chad‟s population assessed to be at 
risk.  
• Human migration begins to strain an already unstable region. 
• A meningitis epidemic is spreading across sub-Saharan Africa‟s “meningitis belt”.    
• 4000+ cases in the Lagos area alone. 
• Epidemic creating hysteria and overwhelming strained medical resources. 
• Civil unrest in the Southern Nigeria from mixing of heterogeneous groups results in 450+ 
slaughtered.  
• Large numbers of transplanted Muslims among the dead. 
• Remnants of Niger Delta separatist movement still simmering 
• Cease fire is holding, and anti-government rhetoric is at a minimum. 
• Vocal minority still condemn Western “oil imperialism”.  
• West Africa 2014 
• Tensions rise between Muslims and Christians on the heels of the 2013 massacres. 
• Due to mass migrations Muslim/Christian divide is blurred. 
• Muslims and tribal retaliations against Christians.  
• Intermittent periods of drought continue to strain food supplies.    
• Cereal production is down 13% from previous year.  
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• Total reduction in crop harvests across Southern Niger into Nigeria. 
• Civil unrest grows in scale and scope throughout Southern Nigeria.  
• Anti-government rhetoric begins and quickly spreads. 
• Increased attacks on Niger Delta oil fields claiming foreign workers‟ lives.  
• Catastrophic pollution due to oil field interdictions.  
• Oil spills from pipes in Delta region continue to pollute the ecosystem, 
affecting groundwater, crops, and Niger river fishing/aquaculture 
• Forest and farmlands covered in sheen of oil. 
• “West is to blame for the oil that pollutes our land” 
• US/Rest of World 2014 
• US completes final withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq. 
• Troops return to a „war weary‟ nation.   
• US increases reliance on West African imported crude oil.     
• West Africa now provides 25% of US crude oil.  
• Venezuelan government has restricted oil exports to US. 
• Mexican oil production has decreased drastically over the past 4 years. 
• US situation. 
• Economy never fully comes out of downturn. 
• Unemployment is at 13.2% nationally. 
• Heroin use becomes drug of choice. 
• Nigerian-Americans demand intervention in growing W/C Africa crisis. 
• Global Market.  
• Instability in West Africa stresses an already fragile global market. 
• Price of oil surpasses $300/bbl. 
• The US dollar drops to unprecedented lows. 
• West Africa 2015 
• China attempts to increase influence in the region. 
• Offer increased humanitarian assistance and security for oil fields. 
• Continue bid to buy one-third of Nigeria‟s oil reserve.  
• Dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula re-emerges.    
• Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria focused on: 
• 15 billion barrels of new oil reserves discovered.  
• Increased fishing throughout the disputed area. 
• Population shift.  
• Irregular migration from W. Africa through the Maghreb into Europe 
increases. 




• MEND and Niger Delta extremists gain strength amidst the lack of government 
reform.  
• Piracy and criminal activity increase with a shift from opportunistic threats to 
more organized armed actions. 
• Conduct attacks against Nigerian Naval Vessels/Bases. 
• Conduct attacks against Chinese security forces and economic interests. 
• Major oil spill off the coast of West/Central Africa. 
• Physical facility failure at both Agbami and Bonga oil fields. 
• Estimated 470,000 barrels/day spilled into the Gulf of Guinea 
• Recurring floods throughout the region.    
• Displacement of over 100,000 people.  
• Disruption of inshore oil extraction/processing. 
• Diverts attention of military/navies. 
• Environmental impact: 
• Bacterial encephalitis epidemic spreads across coastal regions.    
• Aggressive mosquito control program put in place by Nigerian government 
using DDT.  
• Climate and pollution cause ecological distress on fisheries and wildlife. 
• Fresh water fisheries stock level reduced by 50%. 
• Fisheries stock assessed to be in near ruins.     
• DDT toxins assessed to have killed an estimated 35% of fresh water fish.  
• Oil spills offshore assessed to have killed and/or poisoned large numbers 
saltwater fish. 
• West Africa 2016 
• Strategically important region given proven oil resources; primarily controlled by 
Nigeria   
• Tensions in Southern Nigeria over oil revenue sharing 
• Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) involved in illegal 
activities ranging from hostage taking, to oil bunkering and hijacking of ships in 
region 
• Ethnic and religious divides in Nigeria contribute to inter- and intra-regional 
tension 
• Non-state actors may attempt to capitalize on regional tensions to establish 
support for future operations 
• Oil bunkering –theft of oil by tapping into pipelines, hijacking oil barges, etc.  
• cause an estimated $5B in losses annually 
• Piracy –common in waters off Nigeria and Cameroon 
• Not as sophisticated an operation as off Somalia, but  
increasing in both frequency and levels of violence 
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• Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon best regional partners for effective naval 
operations 
• Militant activity: MEND  
• Niger Delta separatists loosely confederated as the Movement for the 
Emancipation  
• Claim to struggle against government and oil companies for equal distribution of 
oil wealth, environmental preservation and freedom from foreign influence  
• Weapons and drugs smuggling 
• Smuggling routes correspond with shipping lanes 
• Weapons routed throughout Africa; drugs generally destined for European 
countries 
• Illegal fishing  
• Drastically reducing fishing stocks in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
 South Asia 2030 
 
Maritime Security Issues Facing South Asia: 
• Smuggling and Trafficking 
• Vast unpatrolled borders in South Asia facilitates trafficking and smuggling of 
many items, including human trafficking and smuggling of natural resources, 
livestock, drugs, and weapons 
• Piracy 
• An increasingly significant concern in the Bay of Bengal area.  The lines between 
piracy and terrorism have largely eroded 
• Transnational Terrorism  
• Most significant terrorist organizations are Al Qaeda, Taliban, and various 
indigenous Pakistan Terrorist Groups, responsible for numerous high profile 
terrorist attacks throughout the region  
• Separatist Movements 
• South Asia continues to struggle with significant separatist movements  
• Communist Party of India 
• Communist Party of Nepal 
• Jumma and Kashmir militants - Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) 
• By 2030, the region‟s overall maritime security capability remains limited but is 
improving 
• India and Pakistan only nations with sufficient maritime security forces 
• Regional nations unwilling to cooperate on maritime security patrols   
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• Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka have limited maritime security forces 
• Bangladesh‟s largest port Chittagong is marred by corruption, armed robbery, and 
piracy 
• Increasing sea levels overrun most western Bangladesh ports and forced 
merchants to Chittagong 
• Regional Navies and National Police underfunded, undertrained and 
underequipped 
 
Road to Crisis, 2010-2020: 
• Indian government commences extensive modernization and industrialization campaign 
to keep pace with China  
• Villages and farm land sold to industrial giants 
• Rural „forgotten‟ population becomes largely displaced in refugee camps 
• Modernization and Industrialization campaign increases internal and region strain 
• Maoists vow to correct present governments wrongs  
• Dengue Fever epidemic spreads throughout Bangladesh 
• Flow of migration towards India increases  
• Fears of a pandemic increase due to migration 
• India denies to recognize the humanitarian need in Bangladesh   
• Bangladesh-India relations “Flash Points” 
• A major area of contention has been the Farakka Barrage Dam built by India to 
increase water supply in the river Hoogly. Bangladesh insists that it does not 
receive a fair share of the Ganga waters during the drier seasons, and gets flooded 
during the monsoons when India releases excess waters. 
• Illegal Bangladeshi immigrants and their settlements on Indian side metro cities 
are Stressing the system and causing major issues. 
• Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami  Sunni Islamic fundamentalist terrorist / militant 
organization still very active and could target infrastructure such as the 
controversial Farakka Barrage  
• Increased drug and human trafficking from Myanmar and Malaysia 
• Traffickers use Indian ports as a transit point 
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam‟s (LTTE) „phantom fleet‟ assessed to be vessels 
of choice 
• Al Qaeda becoming more active in the region 
• Increased use of merchant fleet in conducting terrorist operations   
• Pakistan ports increasing point of embarkation 
 
Road to Crisis, 2020-2025: 
• Global climate change affecting South Asia significantly 
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• By 2025 it is well documented that the regions glaciers have reduced by 15-20% 
• Increased glacier melting has caused catastrophic flooding on a reoccurring basis 
• Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Eastern Myanmar affected 
• Millions of displaced villagers move to refugee camps  
• Unrealized social improvements contribute to increased insurgency in and around New 
Delhi 
• Suspected links to Pakistan and Maoists 
 
Road to Crisis, 2026: 
• Indian Maoist insurgency grows in intensity throughout India 
• Growing union with Communist Party in Nepal 
• Major clashes between police/military and insurgents 
• Indian government‟s massive offensive deemed unsuccessful 
• Displaced villagers move to overcrowded refugee camps 
• Tensions rise between diverse groups 
• Tens of thousands of Bangladeshi migrants killed by Indian security forces 
• Major Category 3 cyclone strikes Sri Lanka and South Eastern India 
• 500K+ deaths from extensive flooding and follow-on disease 
• Indian resources stressed in disaster response 
 
Road to Crisis, 2027-2028: 
• Glacier melt from Kashmir region has dramatically decreased 
• Major drought ensues along the Pakistan-India border lasting 2 years 
• Tens of millions of Pakistani and Indians succumb to famine 
• India starts a massive river diversion plan to alleviate water shortages 
• India withdrawals from Indus Waters Treaty 
• Tensions between Pakistan and India rise as water and food becomes scarce 
• China increases military presence in India / China border 
• 25% of Taiwan Strait forces (SAMs, troops, and MRBMs) move to storage facilities 
in the west 
 
Road to Crisis, 2027-2028: 
• China has major concerns regarding the faltering region 
• Potential to disrupt oil flow 
• Potential to cause unwarranted migration into Tibet 
• The US and Western Europe begin routine meetings concerning the security situation in 
South Asia 
• Potential for China-India-Pakistan conflict among main topics of discussion 
• Potential for global economic system disruption 
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• Media portrayals 
• China: “The South Asian situation is grim; this further solidifies China as the 
leading stabilizing force in Asia” 
• US: “The inhumane conditions have reached an unprecedented scale” 
• Europe: “The international community needs to come to aid of South Asia to 
save the people from this apocalyptic series of disasters”  
 
Road to Crisis, 2029: 
• Irregular monsoon season devastate crops and water supplies   
• India puts water restrictions in place that result in large arid areas in Bangladesh 
• Continuous rise of sea level encompasses 25% of Bangladesh land  
• Mass migration into India due to famine and loss of land to sea level increase 
• Estimated 50 million migrating 
• By land and sea 
• Bangladeshi migration causing a major security concern for an already stressed Indian 
security force 
• Union of India and Nepal communist parties put major pressure on current Indian 
government 
 
Road to Crisis, 2030: 
• Increased evidence of Chinese support of insurgent groups in India 
• Mass disorder throughout Bangladesh  
• Maritime crime at all time high 
• Targeting neighboring country‟s ports  
• Increased incursions and exercise activity by Chinese on and along Indian Northeastern 
border 
• Pakistan‟s government issues demarche against Indian government 




• Reaffirming previous resolutions calling for relief of humanitarian crisis 
• Recalling previous efforts of members to relieve humanitarian crises: displaced 
persons, hunger, and disease 
• Deeply concerned-about violence on borders and human suffering due to long 
term environmental conditions, criminal activities, and political instability 
• Requests- 
• deployment of 20,000 personnel and associated support 




• New mandate- deploy 20,000 military and civilian personnel in areas of volatility 
to promote re-establishment of confidence, discourage violence, deter unlawful 
activities in territorial waters and the high seas 
• Support regional security capacity building 
• Improve security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided 
• Assist in voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons 
• Authorizes 
• Establishment of UN Mission and observer force in border area and key locations 
for humanitarian assistance and monitoring of agreements 
 
 
 
